Physical Device Identification

9 October 2007

I have been reading some papers suggested by Janne Lindqvist on the subject of device identification, an often neglected aspect of traffic analysis.

Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting by Kohno et al. introduced the clock skew technique for uniquely identifying networked devices that support the TCP timestamp extensions. The key idea is that the clock skey of each device’s clock is unique, and observing the time drift over a long period allows an adversary to identify it. The technique has been extended by Steven Murdoch in his paper Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by their Clock Skew where he uses it to identify Tor hidden services.

For simpler devices, that may not have a TCP/IP stack, identification can be done at an even lower level. In their work entitled Implications of Radio Fingerprinting on the Security of Sensor Networks, Ramussen and Capkun discuss how the shap of the radio transmission signal can be used to uniquely identify many sensor Cipcon 1000 nodes. For their identification they use features of the radio transient, which is the window of signal between no transmission and a transmission start. By measuring the length, number of peaks, variance of amplitude, and the first wavelet coefficients they manage to identificy the majority (70%) of nodes.

A weakness of the work is the suggestion to use these features to strengthn identification. While this might work in the short term (a similar technique was used to detect first generation cloned mobile phones) in the long run a strategic adversary should have no trouble faking the transient’s signatures.

Finally Corbert et al. present a method to detect the manufacturer of a IEEE 802.11 network device in A Passive Approach to Wireless NIC Identification. The key observation is that the standard supports multipe distinct rates of transmission (of 1, 2, 5.5 and 11 Mbps) and the switching algorithm between the different rates is not standardized. By infering it a good guess can be made as to the vendor of the NIC. Furthermore no interception is required at the physical layer, since the information about rates of transfer is transmitted in clear. A similar approach is advocated in Passive Data Link Layer 802.11 Wireless Device Driver Fingerprinting by Franklin et al.

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One Response to “Physical Device Identification”

  1. […] attacker model was restricted to using commodity hardware, so physical device fingerprinting attacks were not considered. Posted by gdanezis Filed in Traffic Analysis Leave a Comment […]

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