The latest revelations about the NSA attacking some of the largest US cloud providers’ communications, are also accompanied by Cambridge Member of Parliament, Julian Huppert, call to revise the oversight of UK intelligence agencies. Similar calls were made in the US about better oversight of their security agencies. Julian concludes in this Guardian “Comment is Free” piece that:

“Who can read this, and how do we want to protect this? We need to agree the rules now, before we completely lose control.”

While better oversight is in itself a good thing, the over-reliance on “oversight” or privacy regulation, such as data protection regimes, is a typical example of what I call the “liberal fallacy”. The liberal fallacy is the belief that privacy is a complex social technical issue, and as a result it needs to be addressed first and foremost by better regulation, since it cannot be addressed by technical means alone.

The argument is extremely appealing for a number of reasons, and when put so reasonably I would be surprised if most privacy and security professionals, as well as policy makers and civil society advocates would not agree with it. After all, privacy in indeed both complex, and not merely a technical property. Privacy is not an absolute right, and regulation can “balance” the rights of the individual against the collective needs to revoke this right in certain circumstances. In a liberal democracy both the state and companies operate within the rule of the law, therefore proper regulation seems a light weight mechanism to solve the privacy problem.

The problem is that the “better regulation and oversight” argument is just non-sense in the context of the NSA and GCHQ spying allegations. The reason for thi, is that the national regulations do not affect the willingness, legality or ability of other states to conduct mass surveillance operations. Better German privacy legislation would not have protected the German head of state’s telephone conversation against US agencies. Similarly, better UK oversight of GCHQ will not extend any protections the US afford to US persons only to the UK population. For any national legislation offering you strong privacy guarantees and good oversight, there are about 205 other jurisdictions in which spying on you is not only legal, but highly ethical, patriotic, in the national interest, and rather well funded by tax payers.

National legislation works best in the context of territorial matters, where proximity and ability to harm is related to physical distance and location, and an army ensures territorial integrity. The internet is not like that: a US, Russian or Chinese router is as close to your UK web-site or switch as one in the UK. Benefiting from strong protections by UK entities, does nothing to protect you from other dangers that are just as close. It is shocking that US agencies were targeting cloud providers, but now we know they were not doing so only using their legal authority, but also just intercepting their communications. Even given perfect US oversight, better regulation will not prevent other countries doing the same — only better encryption systems can do that.

I am quite delighted that Julian Huppert does also mention that that placing back doors into security products makes everyone less safe, in line with the statement many UK security researchers made earlier this year. Yet, the focus on regulation is misplaced: against nation state level threats, sadly, only better security and privacy technologies can provide a credible defense for privacy.

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Moving to UCL …

31 October 2013

After a good few years at Microsoft Research, I am now moving to University College London to take a position on Security and Privacy Engineering, at the Computer Science Department.

I am joining a fantastic team of researchers: Angela Sasse heads the group and is doing pioneering work on human aspects of security; Jens Groth is an expert on cryptography, and zero knowledge; Nicolas Courtois is a leading cryptanalyst, and has hit the news many times in the past by demonstrating vulnerabilities in deployed systems. Alongside myself, Emiliano De Cristofaro, who works on applied cryptography and privacy, and David Pym, who has a dual interest in formal methods and economics of security, are also joining the group.

One of my first non-research tasks at UCL is to teach theĀ  Computer Security 1 course, which is a broad introduction to the basics of computer security. As a matter of principle, namely that the highest levels of quality of protection are achieved when computer security is discussed in public, I consider that the class to be a public event and open to anyone who would like to attend (subject to space restrictions). So if you are based in London, and would like access, just let me know.