Last term I had the opportunity and pleasure to prepare and teach the first course on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) at University College London, as part of the MSc in Information Security.

The course covers principally, and in some detail, engineering aspects of PETs and caters for an audience of CS / engineering students that already understands the basics of information security and cryptography (although these are not hard prerequisites). Students were also provided with a working understanding of legal and compliance aspects of data protection regimes, by guest lecturer Prof. Eleni Kosta (Tilburg); as well as a world class introduction to human aspects of computing and privacy, by Prof. Angela Sasse (UCL). This security & cryptographic engineering focus sets this course apart from related courses.

The taught part of the course runs for 20 hours over 10 weeks, split in 10 topics:

Most importantly the course includes 10 hours of labs (20 next year!), split into 5 exercises, that give students (and their teachers!) hands on experience implementing extremely advanced privacy enhancing technologies. More generally the course provides an introduction to solid cryptographic engineering, test-driven development, testing & QA tools and code audits. The programming language used was Python on a Linux environment, with the petlib library that was specially developed for this course.

For each lab exercise students in pairs were provided with a partial code file, and a set of unit tests, and were asked to fill in the remaining code to fulfill the task, and at least make the unit tests pass. The topics of the exercises track the first 5 lecture topics:

Finally, part of the grading was based on students performing a code review of other groups, looking for code defects leading to security or other bugs.

Overall, I am very proud of the progress everyone made. The course was attended by 16 MSc student and 2 MEng students. Everyone eventually was able to complete all lab assignment — not a given considering the advanced nature of the tasks at hand. It was evident while discussing with student the final exercise, on building a selective disclosure credential, that many had developed an intuitive understanding of how to build solutions based on zero-knowledge protocols, and all had definitely overcome their initial fear of these more advanced concepts in PETs.

I was also very impressed with many students that were able to tackle the hardest questions in the exam. One of those questions, basically asked students to re-invent a variant of the privacy preserving genomic testing protocol we presented at WPES 2014 — and many did successfully. Similarly, they were asked to de-anonymize a mechanism very similar to the 15:15 rule in place in California to “protect” smart meter reading, and again many did so successfully under time constrain and the high pressure environment of exams. As ever, the great engagement from students was the most rewarding part of teaching the course.

All material is available online (see links to slides, and git repositories), and I would be delighted to share / receive any additional exercises by others finding this material relevant to their courses.

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I will be participating on a panel this afternoon on “Creating Usable and Secure Software”, in the context of the conference on Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society. I share a platform with a number of illustrious people — Dave Hrycyszyn, Lola Oyelalo and Blaine Cook — with a much deeper experience in usable software and services development. However, I will attempt to provide some context, and my opinions, on why we can observe a broadly poor state of affairs when it comes to usability of privacy technologies — and hopefully open a discussion on how to overcome roadblocks.

My main two positions will be as follows:

  • The political context within which technical security and privacy research and development had to be conducted over the past 40 years greatly contributed to the lack of wide deployment and poor usability of privacy technologies.
  • The lack of “knowledge” about methods for developing usable privacy friendly solutions only offer a partial explanation for this poor state of affairs, and has to compete with other roadblocks that systemically undermined the deployment of usable privacy technologies.

First, it is worth reminding ourselves that research into security technologies and strong cryptography specifically, was until recently the prerogative of governments. Public discussion and know-how on this topic was developed seriously after the mid-1980s, and often despite serious pressure from the US and other governments. The technical security community is small and there remain serious technical challenges to providing privacy friendly solutions — solutions that require deep expertise developed over years of practice (requiring funding).

Second, the export control regimes, and also requirements for cooperation with law-enforcement slowed down significantly the blanket deployment of privacy technologies even after the strict export control regime of the 1990s was lifted. What makes a number of privacy technologies unusable — email encryption, instant messaging encryption — is the fact that common clients do not support them transparently and by default — requiring plug-ins, user configuration and manual key management. Thus the lasting impact of these regulation has not been the non-proliferation of strong crypto technologies, but the lack of integration of these into mainstream platforms. It is telling that the current Law Enforcement and Government narrative is not about preventing encryption know-how from spreading, but rather discouraging wide deployment of such technologies without the ability for back-door or front-door access.

Third, there are commercial pressures — which again have been related with government hostility of the wide deployment of privacy technologies. It is easy to forget that governments, are major customers of technologies. Thus they are able to dictate requirements that make it difficult to widely deploy privacy technologies. It is telling that mainstream mail clients — such as Microsoft Outlook — do not transparently support PGP based end-to-end encryption and have instead opted for S/MIME and models that make the use of encryption by individuals rather difficult. In this context one may assume that the key customers of this software — large enterprises and governments — simply never asked for such features, and in fact probably considered such a feature to conflict with other requirements (such as the need to recover mail of employees, backup, …).

These commercial pressures, have changed in the past few years, as large internet companies start relying heavily on serving end-users (search, webmail, social networking). Sadly, these companies have adopted both a business model — ad-based monetization — and a technical architecture — cloud computing — that makes meaningful privacy protection very difficult. In turn the “success” of those architectures has lead to an extreme ease of developing using this model, and an increasing difficulty in providing end-user solutions with appropriate privacy protections — let alone usable ones.

The rise of services has pushed a number of key privacy technologies into not being commercially supported and a key feature, and in effect at best a “common” — with the governance and funding problems this entails. We have recently learned about the systemic under funding of key privacy technologies such as OpenSSL and GPG. Technologies like Tor are mostly funded for their national firewall traversal features, seeing development on anonymity features suffer. Unlike other commons (health, parks, quality assurance in medicines), the state has not stepped in to either help with governance or with funding — all the opposite. For example, standardization efforts have systematically promoted “surveillance by design” instead of best of breed privacy protection; funding for surveillance technology is enormous compared to funding for privacy technologies, and somehow ironically, a number of calls for funding of privacy technologies are in the context of making surveillance more “privacy friendly” — leading to largely non-nonsensical outcomes.

So, lack of “knowledge” about how to develop usable software, while also a contributing factor, has to be seen within the context of the above structural pressures. In parallel, pressures undoubtedly exist when it comes to the discipline of UX which is in itself recent, and constantly involving. Along with serious funding for collaboration on building more usable privacy software (which the Simply Secure project that I am associated with attempts to provide), we need a strategy to counter those systemic pressures to ensure the wide deployment of usable privacy technologies.